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ABSTRACT
The European Union (EU) is one of the world’s most active imposers
of foreign policy sanctions. By contrast, the EU has never used
formal political sanctions against a member. Why does the EU
favour sanctions as an instrument to deal with norm violations
abroad, but not at home? The article argues that an
understanding of sanctions as ostracism helps illuminate this
discrepancy. Far from technical instruments that can be made to
‘work’ through improved design, sanctions are social instruments
that operate through selective exclusion. An in-depth scrutiny of
public justiﬁcations from the European institutions and individual
politicians shows that both at home and abroad sanctions are
strongly associated with ostracising attributes. However, whereas
practical and symbolic distance-taking from the target is core for
foreign policy sanctions, at home, the same ostracising properties
run against the EU’s traditional insistence on resolving
disagreements through rational dialogue.
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Introduction
European integration has transformed sovereignty. National parliaments are occupied
with turning EU-directives into national legislation, and member states are taken to
court if they violate EU law. The members of the monetary union have delegated ﬁscal
sovereignty, and the austerity paradigm of the euro crisis is based on invasive negative
conditionality. Meanwhile, the EU struggles to establish itself as an international actor,
and is often accused of doing too little, too late, and with lacking unity.
Yet, when it comes to sanctions against violations of fundamental norms, the EU is
extraordinarily active abroad and reluctant at home. With measures in place against 33
diﬀerent countries (see author’s table in appendix 2), the EU is among the world’s most
active imposers of foreign policy sanctions (Portela, 2016). By contrast, despite evidence
of value backsliding in member states, the EU has never used its internal sanctions pro-
vision, the Article 7:3 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) (European Union, 2007/
2009a). This pattern is unique among regional organisations (ROs). Other ROs have
occasionally used sanctions outside of the region, but only the EU uses foreign policy
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sanctions regularly (Hellquist, 2014, p. 9). Meanwhile, regional organisations around the
world are increasingly using sanctions against members that breach regional norms
(see Von Borzyskowski & Portela, 2016).
The article asks: Why does the EU favour sanctions as an instrument to respond to norm
violations abroad, but not at home?
This question is answered through an analysis of how European institutions and politi-
cal leaders justify their sanctions activism abroad, and the reluctance to use sanctions at
home. Justiﬁcations build on political judgments and shape future judgments (Kornprobst,
2014). They thereby help explain puzzling phenomena, not as independent variables in a
strict causal model or by providing access to inner motivations, but as answers to ‘the
social, intersubjective “why”’ (Abulof & Kornprobst, 2017, p. 1). To publicly justify political
action is ‘imperative’ for any political community interested in the outreach of its policies
(Boltanski & Thévenot, 2000, p. 209). Moreover, especially in times of crisis and rising euro-
scepticism, ‘[i]t is crucial to realise that given the EU’s design any EU involvement – as well
as its very existence – is always in need of justiﬁcation’ (Morgan, 2007, p. 332). The main
period covered in this article is 2011-2017. During this time, the EU’s activism abroad con-
tinuously expands to include sanctions in connection to the Arab Spring and the Syrian
civil war, as well as the unprecedented sanctions package against Russia (see Eriksson,
2018, p. 70). During the same period, the Union circumvents the internal sanctions pro-
vision in dealing with a chain of value crises at home.
This article argues that an understanding of sanctions as tools of ostracism, which work
through selective exclusion from community privileges, helps illuminate the EU’s polarised
approach. Sanctions ostracise through a characteristic combination of symbolic disap-
proval and harmful action. Applied to the context of this study, foreign policy sanctions
deﬁne the target as an outcast in the liberal world order, depriving it of access to
normal relations with the EU. This ‘othering’ enables the EU to present itself as an actor
that, in line with its Treaty-commitment (TEU Art. 21) takes international norms seriously.
Sanctions against members would place the target outside of the circle of European
cooperation; exposing contemporary internal ‘others’. However, in a community of
values with a high threshold for membership, internal sanctions were supposed to be
superﬂuous. Speaking with Jan-Werner Müller, there is a mismatch between ‘the very
idea of sanctions’ and ‘a whole EU ethos of compromise, mutual accommodation, and
mutual trust’ (Müller, 2013, p. 17).
The article proceeds in four steps. The ﬁrst section describes the contradiction in the
EU’s approach to sanctions in connection to previous research. Thereafter, the second
section outlines the article’s argument about ostracism and sanctions. The third section
presents the empirical support for the argument. The fourth section concludes.
Sanctions at home and abroad
The starting point of this study is that internal and external sanctions are two sides of one
coin: the EU’s approach to sanctions. While not identical, they are comparable as two
instances of institutionalised action against violators of fundamental norms. European pol-
icymakers are increasingly concerned with coherence between internal and external pol-
icies. In an open letter to José Manuel Barroso, then President of the European
Commission, the German, Dutch, Danish and Finnish foreign ministers Westerwelle,
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Timmermanns, Sövndal, and Tuomioja (2013) emphasised that ‘[t]he credibility of the Euro-
pean project depends on us living up to the standards we have given ourselves’. In his 2013
State of the Union address, Barroso (2013) himself declared: ‘There is no doubt about it. Our
internal coherence and international relevance are inextricably linked‘. His successor, Jean-
Claude Juncker (2014), likewise expressed that ‘we are credible to the outside world if we
demand high standards of ourselves when it comes to fundamental values’. As a recurrent
theme, CFSP High Representative Federica Mogherini speaks of ‘[a] world where internal
and external policies are more intimately linked than ever’ (2015e).
Yet, scholars have so far treated internal and external sanctions as diﬀerent creatures
(see, though, Börzel & van Hüllen, 2015). The literature on foreign policy sanctions has
mainly been interested in issues of selection, impact, and eﬀectiveness. Central contri-
butions focus on why sanctions are used in some cases but not in others (e.g. Boogaerts,
2016; Hazelzet, 2001), on why sanctions became the EU’s common response to the Russia-
Ukraine crises (Sjursen & Rosén, 2017), on the structural environment in which the
common sanctions policy emerged (Jones, 2007), on conditions for eﬀectiveness
(Portela, 2010), on coercion, constraint and signalling as means of inﬂuencing the target
(Giumelli, 2011), on the transformation of sanctions through ‘targeting’ (Eriksson, 2011),
and on human rights consequences for targets (e.g. Heupel & Zürn, 2017). Whereas this
literature has advanced our understanding of the causes and consequences of the EU’s
turn to sanctions, until now few have engaged with the fundamental legitimacy and –
by extension – appropriateness of the EU’s sanctions policy at large. This is surprising con-
sidering that, in contrast to other types of conditionality or countermeasures, foreign
policy sanctions lack contractual basis, have unclear support in international law (see
Doxey, 1980; White & Abass, 2010) and face growing opposition from a clear majority of
the world’s countries (see OHCHR, 2017 and linked UN resolutions).
That the EU has not imposed sanctions against Hungary and Poland has been much
debated, ﬁrst in blogs (e.g. Verfassungsblog) and eventually in academic publications
(e.g. Closa & Kochenov, 2016; Kelemen & Blauberger, 2017; Kochenov, Magen, & Pech,
2016). We have now excellent insights into the Polish and Hungarian situations, as well
as into the party-politics of sanctions at the European Parliament (Sedelmeier, 2014,
2017). However, the reluctance to use sanctions at home has mostly been taken as a
given premise rather than as something to be explained. Largely accepting policymakers’
description that institutional requirements make article 7 sanctions unusable (e.g.
Kelemen, 2017, p. 230; Scheppele, 2016a, p. 106), scholars have instead drafted proposals
for alternative procedural strategies (see contributors in Closa & Kochenov, 2016; Müller,
2013).
The thresholds for imposing internal sanctions are, indeed, demanding. The European
Council has full discretion in unanimously deciding when ‘a serious and persistent breach’
of Article 2 norms has occurred (Article 7.2 TEU). This step may be initiated by the Commis-
sion or one third of member states, and the ensuing decision requires consent by the Euro-
pean Parliament. Qualiﬁed majority in the European Council is thereafter needed to
‘suspend certain of the rights deriving from the application of the Treaties to the
Member State in question, including the voting rights of the representative of the govern-
ment of that Member State in the Council’ (7.3).1
However, the institutional factor cannot explain the discrepancy in the EU’s approach to
sanctions at home and abroad. The threshold for CFSP sanctions to be imposed is also
CONTEMPORARY POLITICS 395
high, with ﬁrst framework decisions requiring unanimity in the Council (Article 31:1 TEU).2
Council Decisions contain all measures in a sanctions regime, and are suﬃcient for travel
bans and arms embargoes (which are implemented directly by member states). Sup-
plementary implementing legislation through Council Regulations (qualiﬁed majority,
upon proposal by High Representative and the Commission) is needed for trade and
ﬁnancial measures (Art 215 TFEU, European Union, 2007/2009b).
The crucial commonality is that for sanctions to emerge all member states must agree.
In the case of internal sanctions, the potentially targeted country is excluded (Article 354
TFEU). The currently most discussed potential targets Poland and Hungary are in a ‘loyalty
pact’ which would bloc sanctions against either. However, it has been proposed that this
‘fellow-traveller veto’ could be overcome by acting simultaneously against both countries
(Scheppele, 2016b). Moreover, such pacts could be envisaged also for CFSP sanctions,
where interests often diverge between member states.
Complementing the focus of the established literatures on eﬀectiveness (abroad) and
procedures (at home), this study is interested in the intersubjective meaning of sanctions.
It speaks in at least three ways to scholarship on sanctions as well as on European inte-
gration and the EU as an international actor. First, the argument about ostracism shows
the limits of rationalistic models for grasping the meaning of sanctions in international
and regional relations. The basic understanding of sanctions as primarily social instru-
ments contrasts with the tendency to treat them as technical instruments that can be
made to ‘work’ through more sophisticated design and strict implementation. Second,
the study of public justiﬁcations oﬀers an unusual engagement with reasonable
grounds for using sanctions in diﬀerent contexts. The way that the EU assumes a right
to use foreign policy sanctions contrasts with the centrality of legal and social legitimacy
for arguments about the Article 7. Third, the article makes an empirical contribution to the
concurrently topical and classical debate of how to ensure normative discipline within the
Union, and how to extend normative loyalty into ‘the world outside’ (Diez, 2005, p. 627).
The discursive framing of the Article 7 as a ‘nuclear option’ for insiders, next to CFSP sanc-
tions’ dialectical play with normality and punishment for outsiders, show how basic cat-
egories of belonging – rather than eﬀectiveness considerations or institutional
prerequisites – determine policy.
Ostracism and sanctions
This article argues that if we are to understand the EU’s contradictory approach to sanc-
tions at home and abroad, we need to acknowledge that sanctions are primarily social
instruments which work through selective exclusion from community. The ostracising
properties of sanctions are appealing to the EU as an international actor claiming a high
normative posture, while it does not ﬁt with its internal self-understanding as a group
of (normative) equals where disagreements are resolved through rational dialogue.
A bundle of concrete measures, from selective economic embargoes to suspension of
membership (or other institutionalised) rights, to travel bans and asset freezes against indi-
viduals, organisations, and companies, ﬁt under the umbrella term of ‘sanctions’. The
common denominator of these measures is that they combine an explicit message of dis-
approval with an actual removal of something considered valuable to the target. It is this
characteristic combination of symbolic and material attributes within an institutional
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framework that distinguishes sanctions from other tools of inﬂuence (e.g. diplomatic
demarches, ‘naming and shaming’, litigation), making them outstanding carriers of
ostracism.
Ostracism – ‘the social death penalty’ (Ouwerkerk, Kerr, Gallucci, & Van Lange, 2005) – is
about rejection from a community. At the extreme, sanctioning ‘embodies judgment and
seeks to associate the target with all that is reprehensible in the human character and
human history’, thereby excluding it ‘from the circle of civilized society’ (Schulz, 2015, p.
39). Not only does ostracism inﬂuence relations between countries and other collective
actors, through the symbolic establishment of who is an insider and outsider in the inter-
national or a regional community; ostracism through sanctions is often literal. The expul-
sion of diplomats, a classical, often reciprocal, sanction in foreign policy disputes, amounts
to the physical rejection of individuals from the territory. Similarly, travel bans prohibit
individuals (and legal entities) from entering the sender’s territory. The ‘lifeline’ of an ostra-
cised individual is ‘severed’ (Case & Williams, 2004, p. 337), in the case of targeted sanc-
tions by depriving access to social beneﬁts and rendering economic participation in
modern society impossible (De Goede, 2011). Hence, De Goede (2011, p. 500) sees black-
listing ‘in terms of its symbolic function of banishment and exclusion, which simul-
taneously redraws the boundaries around normal, valued, ways of life’.
Within regional organisations, suspension of membership or rights associated with
membership is the most used formal sanction.3 Excluding a member from meetings, can-
celling voting rights, cutting funds or in other ways putting a halt to political conversation
or normal modes of conduct means to cut the member of a community away from its
social belonging and privileges associated with it (see Hellquist, 2015, p. 327). If ostracism
in the case of foreign policy sanctions is about determining the boundaries of international
community in an abstract sense, and about access to Europe in a practical sense, in the
case of internal EU sanctions it is about exclusion from the regional community and
from practices of European cooperation. Beyond the reputational damage, a member
state under sanctions could face considerable material costs (e.g. market reaction,
decline in tourism and investments). Testimonies from other regions tell us that also in
the case of sanctions against members, ostracism is ‘not only’ symbolic but amounts to
physical exclusion. To give one example, in December 2016 Venezuelan foreign minister
Delcy Rodriguez was physically hindered to enter Mercosur’s summit meeting in Buenos
Aires since her country’s membership had been suspended (BBC, 2016).
Sanctions represent a rupture with ‘normal’ (or ‘customary’, Hufbauer, Schott, & Elliott,
1990, p. 2) aﬀairs (see Baldwin, 1985, p. 59). It is through this rupture that the target is told
that it has crossed a line. One way of thinking of this process is that the sender draws its
‘limits of toleration’ by using sanctions (Rawls, 1993; see Adler-Nissen, 2014, pp. 170–171;
Hoﬀmann, 1967, p. 144). Foreign policy sanctions reply to appalling wrongdoings which
are intimately connected to broader international norms (see Doxey, 1980, p. 9). Sanctions
articulate opposition to these wrongdoings and thereby become formalised counter-
images to the sender’s norm-obedience (see Hellquist, 2016).
That the EU has not employed sanctions under Article 7:3 does not imply that there are
no limits to its toleration at home. The death penalty is a declared red line – ‘incompatible
with the membership of the European Union’ – which would justify sanctions (Timmer-
mans, 2015b). Moreover, in 2000, 14 EU members unanimously judged unacceptable
that the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ), a populist-right party with Nazi-roots (the EU’s
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historical other – ‘past as other’ – Diez, 2005, p. 634) – entered government in Austria. At
the time, there was no Treaty provision covering situations of not yet materialised risks of
value breaches. Instead, unique bilateral sanctions from all co-members followed, which
shut Austria oﬀ Council cooperation.
Why then does the EU not use sanctions against Poland or Hungary, despite clearly
documented breaches of common values and the availability of a designated Treaty
clause, if it did so against Austria for letting a democratically elected party into govern-
ment? The answer is twofold. First, as suggested above, the limits of toleration have
changed. Far-right parties have become normalised, making it into government in all Vise-
grad countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia), as well as in Italy, Greece,
Bulgaria, Slovenia, Latvia, Lithuania, Finland, and – again – Austria, and acting as oﬃcial
support parties in the Netherlands and Denmark. None of these situations have produced
a reaction similar to the 2000 sanctions against Austria. Although the populist far-right
parties remain a headache for the European political establishment, they are nowadays
largely tolerated.
Second, the Austrian sanctions case illustrates the diﬃculties of using ostracism within
the European Union. Pushed for by the French and Belgian governments, the bilateral
sanctions were likely motivated by a wish to contain far-right populist parties in their
own countries (Merlingen, Mudde, & Sedelmeier, 2001). However, the warning example
backﬁred, catering a convenient victim-role to the FPÖ and exposing the shaky legitimacy
basis of the EU’s action. According to Wodak and Pelinka (2002, p. 204), sanctions were
‘nothing other than a sleight of hand clearly intended to convey the impression of EU
legitimacy where none exists’. ‘[T]he Austrian government never accepted being labeled
as transgressive’, instead it shifted the debate to ‘how normative discipline should be
upheld in Europe’ (Adler-Nissen, 2014, p. 160). As we will see in the following sections,
this debate has been reopened and intensiﬁed through the recent rule of law crises
among EU members. In foreign policy, by contrast, sanctions have become a near-routi-
nised reaction against the worst normative breaches.
Justifying sanctions at home and abroad
Following the Weberian legacy of verstehen, and Habermas (1996) insistence on reﬂexive
justiﬁcation as a building-block of legitimate order, paying attention to public justiﬁcations
‘as a form of intersubjective reasoning’ is ‘a key piece in the explanatory puzzle of our
socio-political universe’ (Abulof & Kornprobst, 2017, p. 4). Of interest here are public jus-
tiﬁcations – ‘explicit communicative exchanges about good reasons upon which to act’
(Kornprobst, 2014, p. 192), which respond to ‘“the basic legitimation demand” (Williams,
2005, pp. 2–3) of political life’ (in Abulof & Kornprobst, 2017, p. 3). Political statements
are inﬂuenced by the form of the communication, and we can never know if they truthfully
represent inner convictions. However, whether ‘reasonable’ (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2000,
p. 228) and sincere or not, public justiﬁcations are relevant as political acts in their own
capacity (Hurd, 1999, p. 391; Kratochwil, 1989).
In the absence of explicit justiﬁcations of the dual approach to sanctions, the following
compares justiﬁcations of foreign policy sanctions with justiﬁcations of the non-use of
Article 7.3 sanctions. Two main types of documents have been consulted: oﬃcial docu-
ments from institutions and speeches and debate appearances by individual policymakers.
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Oﬃcial documents represent ‘convergences of reasons’ (Kornprobst, 2014, p. 197); the
institutional acceptance of a dominant argument about a political standpoint or action.
Justiﬁcations articulated by individual policymakers in front of an audience, or in engage-
ment with other policymakers, let us into the ‘communicative process of legitimacy-
making (and unmaking) in the public sphere’ (Abulof & Kornprobst, 2017, p. 4). Hence,
to study justiﬁcations is to study the use of language for political purposes. For the
CFSP, the empirical analysis of this article demonstrates how a space for political action
is created through the use of attributive words presenting sanctions as necessary, and a
causal argumentation in which they are the logical consequence of the target’s wrong-
doing. For the article 7, the study shows how the nuclear metaphor (‘nuclear option’) eﬀec-
tively closes the prospective space for political action through sanctions. Instead, the EU’s
approach to the value crises becomes deﬁned in contradistinction to sanctions, emphasis-
ing attributes of dialogue, objectivity, and rationality.
For foreign policy sanctions, all Council decisions, conclusions, and press releases about
the 31 sanctions cases in force as of January 20174 (European Commission, 2017a) have
been analysed. These documents are particularly important since they constitute, or
deal directly with, actual decisions on sanctions. Core strategic documents on sanctions
and the CFSP provide a picture of how the policy, in general, is justiﬁed. Moreover,
public appearances by the High Representative of the CFSP Federica Mogherini (2015–
2017), oﬀer insights into the reasoning of a key player in deﬁning the sanctions policy.
European Parliament debates mentioning foreign policy sanctions between 1999 and
2012 (statements n = 1748) bring an additional comprehensive picture of contestation
over justiﬁcations (translated data is only available until December 2012).
Since the Article 7 is a ‘negative case’ of a not materialised policy, there is no available
data equivalent to the Council communications analysed for CFSP sanctions. Instead, jus-
tiﬁcations have been identiﬁed in milestone communications from the Commission, the
Council, and the European Parliament on the Article 7 in general, as well as on the rule
of law crisis in Poland in particular. Moreover, all speeches and debate appearances
(2014–2017) by Vice-president of the Commission Frans Timmermans have been analysed.
Timmermans has been the main voice of the Commission’s engagement strategies for
dealing with the situation in Poland. In May 2017, the Polish Foreign Minister even
boiled down the conﬂict at hand to ‘tensions between Poland and one commissioner’ –
Frans Timmermans (in Karnitschnig, 2017).
Next, to these principal sources, the analysis also makes use of individual public appear-
ances by other key policymakers from European institutions and member states. Media
reports appear as complementary sources. Unless otherwise speciﬁed, the ﬁndings rep-
resent recurrent patterns of reasoning. All sources quoted in the text are listed in the refer-
ence list (Council of the European Union n = 25; European Council n = 6; European
Commission n = 12; European Parliament n = 5; Mogherini n = 14; Timmermans n = 11;
Reding n = 4; Juncker n = 4; Macron n = 2; Merkel n = 2; Tusk n = 2; Barroso n = 2; Van
Rompuy n = 1).5
Drawing on the earlier discussion of ostracism, the following investigates whether and
how three signiﬁcant traits of ostracism emerge in justiﬁcations of (non)-use of sanctions.
First, ostracism is indicated by symbolic and material distance-taking from the target’s
wrongdoing. Second, the concrete expression of this distance-taking – social exclusion,
predominantly rupture with normal terms of conduct – is taken to signify ostracism.
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Third, in a framework of ostracism, the impact of sanctions in terms of inﬂicting harm is
prioritised over their eﬀectiveness in terms of changing the target. E contrario, justiﬁca-
tions of non-use of sanctions would highlight these aspects as negative factors.
EU foreign policy sanctions
In its communications on decisions, the Council justiﬁes its sanctions as necessary, inevita-
ble reactions to intolerable wrongdoings (e.g. Council of the European Union, 2002, 2014a,
2015a, p. 242; European Council, 2000; 2010, p. 14; Merkel, 2014b). It is in view of the sever-
ity of the norm violation that sanctions are necessary: the EU ‘take[s] the necessary
measures’ (Council of the European Union, 2004), ‘the necessary action’ (European
Council, 2004), ‘necessary decisions’ (European Council, 2004, 2015) ‘as a matter of
urgency’ (Council of the European Union, 2014b), ‘as needed’ (Council of the European
Union, 2015b, p. 242). The policy is tied to the norm violations themselves (ex ante),
rather than to expected policy results (ex post).
Hence, the norm violations – from nuclear proliferation to misappropriation of state
funds, from human rights crimes to fraudulent elections, from (ﬁnancing of) terrorism
activities to breaches of international law (Council of the European Union, 2011a, 2011b,
2012b, 2014d, 2016c, 2017a) – are at the core of the EU’s justiﬁcations. The Council routi-
nely starts with condemning, often in emotional terms (it is ‘appalled and deeply dis-
mayed’, 2014b, ‘disappointed’, ‘extremely worried’ 2011d, or ‘alarmed’ 2012a, 2014e),
the acts committed by the target (see Council of the European Union, 2011b, 2014c,
2015b, 2016b, 2016c; European Council, 1989). The decision to impose (or modify) sanc-
tions is presented as the logical continuation of the wrongdoing: to sanction is what the
EU does under such circumstances. This is a ‘causal argumentation’ (Garssen, 2001, p.
92) where the link between the cause – the norm violation, and the eﬀect – the sanction,
is provided by a causal conjunction (e.g. ‘therefore’, ‘because of’, ‘in view of’, ‘given’) or a
causative verb (e.g. ‘led to’, ‘prompted’, ‘respond to’).
In a universe of almost endless norm violations, the inclusion of some violations under
sanctions is justiﬁed with them being particularly ‘serious’ (European Commission, 2011, p.
16). Commission President Juncker highlights that Russia has surpassed the EU’s limits of
toleration: ‘[i]t is not acceptable for President Putin to redraw borders in Europe. That is
why we imposed sanctions, which are not the smartest form of political reaction’
(Juncker, 2015). By using sanctions, the EU shows that it ‘stands ready to support
Ukraine in more or less all the matters’ (Juncker, 2016). Despite conﬂicting interests, ‘no-
one here, I deeply believe, will ever accept that a state invades and occupies the territory
of another state or kills its citizens’ (Tusk, 2015). Mogherini (2015c) likewise links the
‘impossibility to divide us’ on Russia to ‘a principle that we cannot accept the violation
of international rules’: ‘the basic core principle of the European Union’. The norm violation
obliges the EU’s reaction: ‘You do not change borders by force: not in this continent, not in
this century, not in this millennium. You do not do it, and we will never accept anything
like that’ (Mogherini, 2015a). Sanctions remain in place since ‘we cannot pretend that there
was nothing wrong going on in 2014’ [the annexation of Crimea] (Mogherini, 2017a).
With unacceptability as premise and unity as method, sanctions cut the target’s access
to some aspect of friendly, cooperative relations with the EU. Norm-breaking behaviour
disqualiﬁes the culpable from the EU’s preferred approach of ‘win-win’-solutions,
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partnership, and dialogue (e.g. Mogherini, 2015f, 2016a, 2016b, 2016c). To have a strategic
partnership with Russia would be ‘quite surreal’ as long as there are sanctions: ‘[t]his is not
the state of play that partners normally have’ (Mogherini, 2017a). The severity of the norm
violation precludes ‘business as usual’ (Council of the European Union, 2015a, p. 242;
Mogherini, 2015b; Merkel, 2014a). Similarly, Mogherini (2015d) speaks of how cooperation
with Belarus in the Eastern Partnership framework was ‘put on the back burner’ following
sanctions against post-electoral violence in 2010.
When the EU imposes sanctions, it deﬁnes with one voice what is unacceptable, and
thereby establishes its normative diﬀerence to the target. The EU’s foundational identity
as a ‘community of values’ (Art. 2) is the declared basis of its foreign policy (Art. 21):
‘The Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which
have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement.’ The EU ‘act[s] abroad
because our interests at home – security, prosperity, and the values on which we have
built the European Union – demand it’ (Council of the European Union, 2011c, p. 10). At
the European Parliament, MEP Kamiński (2006) supports sanctions since ‘as a community
of values […] the Union must set an unequivocal example by condemning all infringe-
ments of human rights’. MEP Korhola (2008) sees sanctions as ‘a moral message from
the European community of values’ and MEP Van den Bos (2002) as one cure against
‘powerlessness’ for ‘Europe, the mother of moral values’. Commissioner Kovàcs (2006)
declares that as a ‘community of shared values’, the EU ‘has to make it explicitly clear
that we do not accept the repressive regime of President Lukashenko’, and therefore
‘introduce and maintain sanctions’. Similarly, according to MEP Brok (2000), sanctions
are a way for the EU to ‘prove itself to be a community of values’. MEP Kelam (2011)
thinks that the EU should be ready to ‘cause pain’ through ‘real sanctions’, since ‘it is
our joint responsibility to make authoritarian rulers believe that we take our basic
values seriously’.
EU justiﬁcations demonstrate that ostracism operates in a dialectic between the exclu-
sionary measure and ‘the normal’. The horizon of engagement, of readmittance to normal
relations and escape from the stigma of the target, is the necessary contrast to the rela-
tional sanction. This corresponds to what Mogherini calls the EU’s ‘integrated approach’
(e.g. 2016d), its ‘unique’ (e.g. 2016e) mixing of tools of hard and soft power. Indeed, the
lifting of sanctions reopens political, economic, and physical access to Europe. The
nuclear deal with Iran has ‘a positive impact on trade and economic relations with Iran
including beneﬁts for the Iranian people. It strengthens cooperation and allows for con-
tinuous dialogue with Iran’ (Council of the European Union, 2017b).
Despite repeated assurances from Mogherini (e.g. 2017b and 2018) and other key
actors (e.g. Merkel, 2014b; Van Rompuy, 2014) that ‘sanctions are a tool and not a goal
in themselves’, justiﬁcations pertaining to expectations of how the target will react are
strikingly absent. When sanctions are found to not be ‘working’, the standard conclusion
is that more sanctions are needed: ‘the argument of the “ineﬀectiveness” of sanctions
cannot be used in favour of lifting them’ (European Parliament, 2008, §11, p. 10, 19). As
a dominant pattern, the Council declares its incessant readiness to strengthen, toughen,
reinforce, or tighten (to give just a few examples of expressions used) measures. With
the ineﬀectiveness of the medicine justiﬁcatory ground for increasing the dosage, the
treatment is often protracted. As of 2018-11-01, CFSP sanctions cases in force have on
average been in place for 12 years and 10 months.6
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This is where the story of the ostracism of CFPS sanctions comes full circle. EU sanctions
often have a far-reaching harmful impact on targeted individuals, sectors, and societies
(see Dreyer et al., 2015; Giumelli & Ivan, 2013). Arguments for sanctions are oriented
towards realising this harm to the fullest by means of cutting access to normal interactions
with the EU. Ostracism does not anticipate the target’s reaction, it imposes a consequence
connected to the committed crime.
Sanctions against members
Two intertwined notions are central for understanding the peculiar status of the Article 7 in
EU aﬀairs: the ‘Copenhagen dilemma’ and the ‘nuclear option’. When a chain of rule of law
crises implode around 2011 (Hungary 2011 – cont., Romania 2012, Poland 2015 – cont.)
key policymakers are frustrated. They start to speak of a gap between the high standards
of the Copenhagen criteria – ‘the essential conditions all candidate countries must satisfy
to become a member state’ (European Commission, 2016d) – and how members behave
after accession. The Copenhagen dilemma is born. The expression pinpoints the ‘fact’ that
the EU is ‘very strict with regard to fundamental rights standards of candidate countries
but lack tools once countries have joined’ (European Parliament, 2012, 2013, p. 3;
Reding, 2014b).
Yet, the Article 7 – the legal basis tailored at systematic violations of fundamental article
2 values at the domestic level, including the rule of law (Council Legal Service, 2014, § 17) –
existed since the Amsterdam Treaty (European Union, 1997/1999).7 First created in prep-
aration of Eastern enlargement (Sadurski, 2009), a risk-provision (7.1) had been added in
Nice (European Union, 2001/2003), following the bilateral sanctions experience against
Austria, to allow for early action against not yet materialised breaches of values. Despite
the continuous existence of normative problems within the Union, the envisaged role
of the provision was as a formal safeguard against a distant worst-case-scenario. The
young democracies that joined in the big bang enlargement were thought to be interna-
lised into the existing community of values (created by the fulﬁllment of the Copenhagen
criteria), where there is no need for sanctions. The reintegration of Europe, ‘healing his-
tory’s deep scars’ (Barroso, 2013), was told as a success story of EU ‘transformative
power’ through enlargement (see Grabbe, 2014; cf. Kochenov, 2008). In a communication
from 2003, the Commission is conﬁdent that ‘in this Union of values it will not be necessary
to apply penalties pursuant to Article 7’, since values ‘are the hard core of the Union’s iden-
tity and enable every citizen to identify with it’ (European Commission, 2003, p. 12).
With the rule of law crises and the ensuing formulation of the Copenhagen dilemma, it
becomes diﬃcult to dismiss the Article 7 as unnecessary. Instead, the provision receives its
current framing as a ‘nuclear option’ (Barroso, 2012, 2013), which ‘one should think twice
or better even three times before resorting to’ (Reding, 2014a, p. 2). Other descriptions in a
similar vein are ‘die große Keule’ [the big cudgel] (Westerwelle, in Müller, 2013, p. 17), and
‘ultima ratio remedy’ (Council of the European Union, 2014f).
The ‘nuclear option’ presents sanctions as the opposite of the ‘soft power’ of political
persuasion (see Barroso, 2012). Just as nuclear weapons are supposed to not be used
but serve a security function by deterrence (Brodie, 1959), the magnitude and exception-
ality of sanctions should deter members from misbehaving. By assigning the Article 7 a
place outside of what is politically possible under normal circumstances – it is ‘very
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heavy to handle’, ‘in practice almost impossible to use’ (Reding, 2013b) – the Copenhagen
dilemma is conﬁrmed. Consequently, innovations deﬁned as diﬀerent from sanctions have
ﬂourished: the Commission’s ‘Rule of Law Framework’ (2014b), ‘Justice Scoreboard’ (2013),
and anticipated budget-conditionality (2018), the Council’s (2014a) ‘rule of law dialogue’8,
and the Parliament’s (2016) proposed ‘EU mechanism on democracy, the rule of law and
fundamental rights’ as well as ‘European Values Instrument’ (European Parliament, 2018).
Apart from the EP’s proposed mechanism (European Parliament, 2016, §1, 3-4; see the
Commission’s lukewarm reaction, European Commission, 2017b), all innovations circum-
vent the designated sanctions provision in the Treaty, the Article 7. As noted by Kochenov
and Pech (2016, p. 1071), ‘every time the EU institutions have been confronted with a
seriously “backsliding state” they have decided to add yet another pre-stage before
actual sanctions may be considered let alone adopted’.
The conventional tool of normative discipline within EU law – infringement – has been
employed in reaction to speciﬁc problems related to the systemic transformation in
Poland and Hungary. Infringement involves some naming and shaming through ‘incrimi-
nating press releases’ (Tallberg, 2002, p. 617). Yet, the ostracising potential is moderated by
the fact that all members are regularly taken to Court and almost always lose (Börzel,
Hofmann, & Panke, 2012, p. 456). In contrast to political sanctions, infringement is a
legal process which concludes the matter by oﬀering a clear road to reparation: the
verdict itself (which may be an economic penalty).
Among all instruments, the article 7 is uniquely associated with exclusion, shaming and
inappropriate emotionality. Banishing a member from community practices is understood
as a ‘far reaching sanction mechanism’ (Timmermans, 2015c), known in the literature as a
‘material sanction’ (Sedelmeier, 2017). Whereas a real nuclear bomb exercises ostracism in
its most brutal form: shutting the enemy out by means of extinction, the nuclear option
metaphor in EU aﬀairs reﬂects an understanding of sanctions as ‘a kind of normative quar-
antine’ (Müller, 2016, p. 212, original emphasis), where the target would be turned into a
‘pariah state’ (Scheppele, 2016a, p. 106). Asked about a prospective use of sanctions,
Juncker (in Macdonald, 2016) answered: ‘Let’s not overdramatize…We have to have
friendly and good relations with Poland so our approach is very constructive. We are
not bashing Poland.’ Around the same time, Council President Tusk remarked that the
Polish situation would only make it onto the agenda of the European Council through
an activation of the Article 7, which he did ‘not believe is a good idea’. Instead, he
sought to ‘calm down the hotheads’, ‘tone down the emotional debate’, and questioned
‘this persistent emphasis on bad narrative’. The one who ‘uses too-strong words or takes
actions that do not entirely match the Western European community of values’ ‘has to be
ready for a strong reaction’, but ‘this reaction cannot be hysterical’ (Tusk, 2016, translator’s
version from Polish). In March 2018, the three Baltic countries declared (in Bodalska, 2018)
that they would not support sanctions against Poland if the Article 7 procedure were to
continue: ‘We would be against any punishments imposed on Poland’, Latvian Prime Min-
ister Maris Kuczinskis stated. The Estonian Prime Minister Jurim Ratas elaborated: ‘Any pro-
blems related to voting and taking away the right to vote – I do not think that it should
happen at all, it would be a step too far’.
Notably, the Article 7 requires the Council to ‘take into account the possible conse-
quences of such a suspension on the rights and obligations of natural and legal
persons’ (TEU 7:3). Any EU action in the sensitive domain of rule of law needs to have
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an identiﬁed ‘added value’, including in terms of ‘a real positive impact on the lives of
ordinary persons’ (Council of the European Union, 2013). In March 2017, Timmermans
(2017a) tells the European Parliament that he is sometimes tempted ‘to be the biggest
hero of the day, and just invoke Article 7’. Yet, he concludes that ‘[e]voking article 7
now would be self-defeating and would not help us in the wider context of what is
going on’.
Although the Council legal service (2014) questioned the legal basis for introducing a
new procedure circumventing the article 7, the Commission’s Rule of Law initiative was
launched in March 2014 and ﬁrst tried out since January 2016 against Poland (European
Commission, 2016a, 2016b, 2016c). The framework explicitly aims to avoid the use of sanc-
tions (European Commission, 2014b, p. 7; Reding, 2014b). As put by Timmermans (2017b):
‘We have always said that our stated objective is not the imposition of sanctions or resort-
ing to Article 7.’ That sanctions are outside of the scope of this ‘pre-Article 7 procedure’
(Reding, 2013a; see Kochenov & Pech, 2016) is visualised in the Commission’s graphical
illustration of the framework (in Appendix 1; European Commission, 2014a).
A counterimage to the nuclear option of sanctions, the rule of law framework is consist-
ently justiﬁed with reference to properties that stand in contrast to ostracism. The ‘aim is
not to accuse, to go into a polemic’ (Timmermans, 2016a), but to engage in a ‘constructive
and facts-based dialogue’ ‘in a spirit of cooperation not of confrontation’ (Timmermans,
2016b; see Reding, 2013a). As an ‘independent and objective referee’ (Barroso, 2013), an
‘objective arbiter that is never blinded by political colours’ (Reding, 2014a), the Commis-
sion’s action is to be ‘non-ideological’, ‘fair[…]’, ‘objective[…]’, ‘impartial[…]’, ‘swift[…]’
(Timmermans, 2015a). This corresponds to the Council’s insistence that any action in
the ﬁeld of rule of law must be consensus-oriented and follow a ‘transparent’ and ‘objec-
tive’ evidence-based methodology (Council of the European Union, 2013). The issued rec-
ommendations should ‘help the Polish authorities to ﬁnd a solution’, ‘oﬀer some advice’,
‘encourage progress’, ‘solve the issues in a rational way based on our legal obligations’
(Timmermans, 2016a, 2016b, 2016c), and ‘remedy the current situation’ (European Com-
mission, 2017d). As noted by Pech (2016), ‘the whole point of the Commission’s Rule of
Law Framework is to promote the resolution of relevant problems via a discursive
approach’.
As expressed by Barroso (2013), how to discipline normative backsliding among
members ‘is a debate that is key to our idea of Europe’. The weight attached to suspension
of membership rights follows from deep-rooted idea of the European project as one which
is not made to exclude but to include (Timmermans, 2015c).9 The insistence on a ‘perma-
nent dialogue which must be based on mutual understanding and respect’ is contrasted
with the pre-integration ‘confrontational mode based on false ideological diﬀerences’
(Timmermans, 2015c, 2015d).10 As put by Juncker (2017): ‘Europe has been divided: she
must never again be redivided’.11 Article 7 sanctions, deﬁned through their exclusionary
– hence ostracising – properties, do not ﬁt well with this core understanding of European
cooperation.
However, with European integration in an extraordinary state of (poly)crisis, and with
the Polish authorities not always interested in dialogue under the premises oﬀered by
the Commission (Timmermans, 2017c), the debate has opened new frontiers. On 20
December 2017, ‘after trying all humanly possible’ (Timmermans, 2017d), the Commission
activated Article 7.1 for the ﬁrst time. Although a historical step, admittedly taken with ‘a
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heavy heart’, this is not a resort to the nuclear option – aka sanctions – but ‘again an
attempt to start a dialogue to resolve the situation’ (Timmermans, 2017c). Without
member state consensus that a breach of Article 2 values has occurred (Article 7.2), sanc-
tions under 7.3 cannot materialise.
Nonetheless, the activation of Article 7.1, together with increasing calls for actual sanc-
tions, illustrate a widening cleavage in the Union. In line with the argument of this article,
this cleavage concerns whether Poland has disqualiﬁed itself from the normal approach of
solidary, rational cooperation. In November 2017, following the Polish vote on the reform
of judiciary, German then minister of Justice (from spring 2018 Foreign Minister) Heiko
Maas declared that ‘a state that shows such scant respect for the rule of law must be pre-
pared to accept political isolation’ (Bundesregierung, 2017). The conservative EPP-group at
the European Parliament called for ‘measures’ against the Polish governments, since ‘[a]
red line was crossed’, ‘[w]ith this vote, the PiS is putting an end to the rule of law and
democracy in Poland and leaving the European community of values’ (Weber & González
Pons, 2017). Months earlier, Emmanuel Macron had promised a tougher line on Poland if
elected President: ‘I want sanctions to be imposed against the lack of respect of the rights
and values of the European Union. This is provided for in the Treaties’ (Ouest France,
2017).12
Much of the engagement with Poland has highlighted the country’s central belonging
in Europe. If Poland no longer qualiﬁes as an insider, if it has ‘decided to isolate itself’
(Macron in Tsolova & Sobczak, 2017) at its own will and through its own sovereign
actions, this invites a redrawing of the EU’s limits of toleration. Commenting on the Com-
mission’s activation of article 7.1, Council President Tusk declared that Poland ‘has turned
its back to the whole EU and, more broadly, to the West’ (in Rettman, 2017). As an ‘outsider’
within the Union, the premise of its protection from sanctions under the normal way of
European cooperation would be shaken. At the same time, the concept of suspension
only works if there is an integral community to return to after penance. In times where
the EU’s legitimacy as a normative authority is particularly frail, and with its borders chan-
ging through Brexit, using sanctions at home would be a high gamble with unpredictable
outcome.
Conclusion
The EU’s dual-face when it comes to sanctions is counter-intuitive. At home, there is a
voluntary contractual bond between member states and the EU, and a mutual interest
that normative standards are respected across borders for the daily micro-practices of
European integration to function. Abroad, the EU opts for sanctions without any contrac-
tual obligation and in situations that often lack obvious relevance for the member states.
This article has argued that an understanding of sanctions as ostracism helps explain
the duality in the EU’s approach to sanctions. Cutting norm-violating third countries oﬀ
normal relations furthers the EU’s self-identiﬁcation as an actor that cares for the preser-
vation of international norms. Sanctions are justiﬁed focusing on the severity of the
crime, leaving the target’s expected reaction unspeciﬁed. In terms of norm promotion,
it is a cul-de-sac, which feeds into the EU’s self-perception as a well versed ‘force for
good’ (e.g. Manners, 2002), but is disconnected from reasoned expectations of sanctions’
ability to foster normative change on the ground.
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At home, already the initial post-world War strategy to integrate economically to
prevent future conﬂicts encapsulated a preference for cooperation over isolation, solidar-
ity over judgmentalism. The big-bang enlargement of 2004 coupled the assumption that
membership would lock-in democratic institutions with emotive arguments about belong-
ing in Europe. As the ‘nuclear option’, Article 7 sanctions would only be used in extreme
situations when this belonging is threatened. Even if the rule of law crises could be seen as
extreme enough to warrant sanctions in principle, the reactions of potential targets predict
that sanctions would in practice not help ﬁx the problem. Hungarian Fidesz, and Polish
Law and Justice have a trump card on hand which the Commission as well as most
targets of foreign policy sanctions lack: they are democratically elected. As long as
these governments enjoy broad popular support, a turn to sanctions risks being not
only ineﬀective, but counterproductive.
In conclusion, the duality in the EU’s use of sanctions constitutes a genuine dilemma.
On the one hand, the EU has deliberately built its external sanctions policy around the
premise that the Union is a value community. It is from this internal identity that the EU
derives a moral mandate to police international norm violations through sanctions. In
addition, coherence between internal and external action is an expressed priority of EU
institutions and individual leaders – not the least of H.R. Mogherini. In view of its claim
to be a holistic normative actor, the ﬂagrant discrepancy in the EU’s view on sanctions
at home and abroad invites accusations of hypocrisy and double standards from targets
of sanctions as well as critical bystanders. Whether merited or not, such accusations
leave a non-trivial mark on the EU’s reputation as an international actor.
On the other hand, it could be argued that politics are – by their very nature – a
repeated story of diﬀerent shades of double standards, of which only some are destructive.
As much as the policy- and scholarly community has been calling for ﬁrmer action against
value-breaking member states, lessons from foreign policy suggest that sanctions advo-
cates at home should be cautious. Change does not come about solely through the inﬂic-
tion of harm but requires that the target is involved. However, there is one decisive
diﬀerence between foreign policy sanctions and measures used against members. If
foreign policy sanctions can be in place for years and years – manifestly at least partly
ineﬀective, the life cycle of sanctions against members would need to be much shorter.
The intensity of cooperation and density of legal commitments make any protracted iso-
lation of a member unpractical and politically hard to defend. If the EU pulls the trigger for
its ‘nuclear option’ it has to be prepared to face the day after. If sanctions do not deliver,
the only remaining option is expulsion: an outlook so drastic that it is not even provided
for by the Treaties.
Notes
1. Under article 7.1, the Commission, the European Parliament (4/5 majority), or one third of the
member states, may call for the Council to determine that there is a ‘clear risk of a serious
breach’ (my emphasis) of article 2 values (4/5 majority, consent by European parliament).
The risk-provision does not cater for any sanctions.
2. If only the voting rule is considered, the threshold for CFSP sanctions is actually more demand-
ing. However, for Article 7 sanctions, the involvement of diﬀerent institutions is an additional
procedural obstacle.
406 E. HELLQUIST
3. During the 2000s, the African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS), the Organization of American States (OAS), the CommonMarket of the South (Mer-
cosur), the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), the Council of Europe (CoE), the Com-
monwealth of Nations, and the League of Arab States (LAS) have all used variants of sanctions
against their members.
4. All cases remain in force as of October 2018. Sanctions against Mali (September 2017) Vene-
zuela (November 2017), and the Maldives (July 2018) were imposed after the study’s cutting
point.
5. The Council of the European Union is the main decision-making organ in the EU, gathering
ministers from member states in diﬀerent policy constellations. The European Council is
where heads of state and government, together with the President of the European Commis-
sion and the High Representative for the CFSP, meet to decide on general political priorities for
the Union. The European Commission is the non-elected executive of the European Union,
which initiates and implements legislation. The European Parliament (EP) is the EU’s directly
elected legislative body, which co-legislates with the Council, supervises the work of other
EU institutions, and functions as the main arena for political debate within the Union.
Federica Mogherini is High Representative of the Union for Foreign Aﬀairs and Security
Policy, head of the European External Action Service (EEAS) – the European Union’s diplomatic
service – as well as ex oﬃcio Vice President of the European Commission, chair of the Foreign
Aﬀairs Council, and co-initiator of implementing legislation on sanctions. Frans Timmermans is
since November 2014 ﬁrst vice-president of the European Commission, in charge of – inter alia
– issues pertaining to the rule of law. Viviane Reding was vice-president of the Commission
between 2010 and 2014, having a portfolio on Justice, Fundamental Rights and Citizenship.
Emmanuel Macron is President of France since May 2017. Angela Merkel is German Chancellor
since November 2005. Donald Tusk is President of the European Council since 2014, succeed-
ing Herman Van Rompuy who had held the position since 2009. Jean-Claude Juncker is Pre-
sident of the European Commission since 2014, replacing José Manuel Barroso who had held
the position since 2004.
6. Author’s calculation based on oﬃcial list of EU restrictive measures in force (last version 2017-
08-04; European Commission, 2017c), updated until 2018-11-01 with the help of the web page
sanctionsmap.eu (created by the Estonian Presidency of the Council of the EU in September
2017 and last updated on 26.10.2018) and cross-checked with the legal expert blog
europeansanctions.com.
7. Bundling several violations in a case has been proposed to enable infringement against sys-
tematic misbehaviour under the Article 2 (e.g. Scheppele, 2016a, p. 114). However, it would
likely require Treaty change (see Reding, 2013b).
8. The three rounds of ‘rule of law dialogue’ held by the Council so far have not dealt directly with
the crises at hand but with sharing national ‘best practices’ and discussing digitalization
(Council of the European Union, 2015c), migration (Council of the European Union, 2016a)
and media pluralism ‘in the digital age’ (Council of the European Union, 2017c).
9. Author’s translation. French original: ‘n’est pas faite pour exclure mais pour inclure’.
10. Author’s translation. French original: ‘un dialogue permanent qui doit être fondé sur la com-
préhension et le respect mutuels’
11. Author’s translation. French original: ‘L’Europe a été divisée; elle ne doit plus jamais être
redivisée’.
12. Author’s translation. French original: ‘Je veux que sur le non-respect des droits et des valeurs
de l’Union européenne, des sanctions soient prises. Les traités le prévoient’
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Appendix 1. The Rule of Law Framework (reproduced from European
Commission, 2014a).
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Target Ground Examples of events Types of measure (2018) First decision*
AFGHANISTAN Terrorism Usama Bin Laden, Al-Qaida, Taliban terrorist activities Asset freezes & travel bans
Arms embargoes
27 May 2002
AL QAEDA and ISIL (DA’ESH)
[FOREIGN TERRORIST
ORGANISATIONS]
Terrorism 9/11 Attacks Asset freezes & travel bans
Arms embargo






Asset freezes & travel bans
Arms embargo
Embargo on internal repression material
24 September 2004
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA Security Undermining Dayton/Paris Peace Agreement Asset freezes & travel bans 21 March 2011




Obstruction of humanitarian aid
Arms embargo
Embargo on internal repression material





Violations of international humanitarian law







Children in armed conﬂict
Exploitation of natural resources
Asset freezes & travel bans
Arms embargo
24 December 2003





Asset freezes & travel bans
Arms embargo
7 April 1993




Arms sales to Somalia







Violent crackdown on protests Asset freezes & travel bans 27 October 2009
GUINEA-BISSAU Security Coup d’etat Asset freezes & travel bans 3 May 2012
(Continued )











Removal of Jean-Bertrand Aristide as President of Haiti in
1991





Asset freezes & travel bans
Arms & dual-goods embargo







Misappropriation of state funds, S. Hussein regime
Asset freezes & travel bans
Restrictions on trade in cultural goods
Restrictions on payment for petroleum and gas
4 August 1990
NORTH KOREA Security Nuclear tests Asset freezes & travel bans
Sectoral trade bans (e.g. natural resources,
seafood, textiles)
Ban on North Korean workers abroad
20 November 2006
LEBANON Security Assassination of Prime Minister Raﬁq Hariri.
Hostilities between Israel and Lebanon (esp. Hezbollah)






Obstruction of the Libyan Political Agreement
Asset freezes & travel bans
Arms embargo
28 February 2011




Manipulation of democratic institutions
Interference with Supreme Court
Asset freezes & travel bans 16 July 2018
MOLDOVA Security
Minority rights
Obstruction of conﬂict settlement
Intimidation of Latin-script schools
Travel bans 27 February 2008
RUSSIAN FEDERATION Security
Territorial integrity
Annexation of Crimea Asset freezes & travel bans
Prohibition on ﬁnancial services
Sectoral trade restrictions
17 March 2014
SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO Security Balkan War Prohibition to satisfy claims rel. to UN embargo 13 June 1994














Target Ground Examples of events Types of measure (2018) First decision*
Asset freezes & travel bans




Obstruction of political process/ceaseﬁre Asset freezes & travel bans
Arms embargo
18 July 2011
SUDAN Security Peace process Darfur Asset freezes & travel bans
Arms embargo
15 March 1994
SYRIA Human rights Violence against peaceful demonstrations
Repression of population
Chemical weapons
Asset freezes & travel bans
Arms embargo
Sectoral trade & investment restrictions (incl. oil
embargo)
9 May 2011




Misappropriation of state funds
Unlawful dismissal of the Crimean government
Asset freezes & travel bans
Crimea/Sevastopol:
Investment & import ban
Sectoral bans (e.g. tourism)
Prohibition to enter Crimean ports
3 March 2014
USA International law &
sovereignty
Extraterritorial sanctions, ﬁrst Helms–Burton Act 1996,
extending US embargo on Cuba to foreign companies
Member States countermeasures to protect the





Manipulation of democratic institutions
Detentions
Asset freezes & travel bans
Embargo on arms & equipment for internal
repression
13 November 2017





Asset freezes & travel bans
Embargo on arms & equipment for internal
repression
Prohibition of military assistance
18 February 2002
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